Sunday, December 21, 2014

UAS Human Factors, Ethical and Moral Issues in Remote Warfare

            Unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) have always been strongly associated with warfare.  Historically, UASs have been utilized during times of war for the purposes of reconnaissance, surveillance, defense and targeting.  These UASs were designed with the intention of performing tasks that were deemed to be too risky or dangerous for standard manned aircraft.  Moreover, UASs afforded pilots the ability to complete these risky missions without necessity of placing themselves or their crew in physical danger.
 Studies have repeatedly indicated that UASs were designed to replace manned aircraft during war for tasks that were considered to be dangerous, dirty, and dull, also known as the three D’s of a consistent operational pattern (Barnhart, Shappee, & Marshall, 2011).  This was particularly an issue with manned aircraft as pilots in war were typically placed in situations where there was a significant likelihood of risk to the pilot and crew.  For example, an enemy may be targeting the manned aircraft for takedown.  A UAS could perform the same task in this situation, but reduce or eliminate risk to the pilot and crew by replacing the manned aircraft.  As a result, there are various human factors, ethical, and moral issues to consider in regards to the use of UASs in warfare.
It is this author’s opinion that UASs should continue to be used in warfare.  The primary reason for this is due to its benefits to reduce human risk.  As previously mentioned, replacing manned aircraft with unmanned aircraft in the line of fire can significantly decrease casualties of war.  Sending a UAS to complete a risky or dangerous mission can and often does result in the protection of lives that may have otherwise been lost if the task had been performed by a manned aircraft.  Further, this also helps protect against certain human factors risks. 
Pilots are susceptible to many environmental factors including fatigue, temperature, air pressure, noise and vibration stress among others.  Most, if not all, of these issues can be easily resolved by sending a UAS instead of a manned aircraft.  Since the operator is controlling the UAS remotely, they are not affected by the physical stressors (vibration, noise, etc).  However, this may present new human factors issues.  For example, although a pilot of a UAS may not suffer from the same form of fatigue as a manned aircraft pilot, this does not mean they will not suffer fatigue at all.  In fact, the task of monitoring their screen for hours on end can end up being just as fatiguing.  This is why shiftwork and necessary sleep would be critical to help eliminate the issue of fatigue.  Along with some human factors problems, the use of UASs can also present some ethical and moral dilemmas.
Currently, UASs are capable of executing lethal force; however this is something that is regulated.  This has its benefits and its drawbacks.  UASs present technological capabilities that can make targeting and eliminating enemies of war efficient and successful.  The clear benefit is that battles can be ‘won’ without needing to step foot on soil.  Instead, operators are able to carry out missions and eliminate targets remotely.  Unfortunately, this can also be viewed as a drawback as it may present some ethical issues.  For example, some may argue that removing the operator from the war field isolates them from the environment, thereby producing a sort of disconnect which may make it easier for them to take lethal action without necessarily considering morality.  In a sense, it makes warfare appear more like a video game, and less real, thereby removing some of the liability from the UAS operator.  Contrarily, manned aircraft literally immerse the pilot in the heart of the action.  In this way, it becomes much more difficult, if not impossible, for the pilot to disassociate him or herself from warfare.  When a pilot of a manned aircraft takes lethal action, it is likely to affect them more so than an remote operator of a UAS.  However, these are issues that can be mitigated with training, briefing, and debriefing.
Although this author believes that UASs remove a layer of moral boundaries, it is still this author’s opinion that UASs should continue to be used in warfare.  The countless lives that UASs can save by implementing them in war outweighs the drawbacks.  Currently, UASs can serve many purposes in war.  Not only can they be deployed to eliminate targets, but they can also serve as decoy targets as well.  This helps reduce threat to actual manned aircraft as well as soldiers and can ultimately save many lives.  However, as with any piece of technology, there is always room for improvement. 
Future considerations should carefully assess the lethality of UASs particularly with autonomous UASs.  Although lethal use is often necessary in warfare, automated lethality should be assessed with caution. If an operator of an autonomous UAS is considering using lethal force, this could cause many problems.  In military remote operations, the operator may spot a target.  The operator must then decide whether or not to engage the target based on four factors: previous knowledge/known factors, danger posed by the subject, the benefit of detaining the subject, and the probability of successfully detaining the subject (Straub, 2013).  When operating UAS, a human being is responsible for making these judgment calls.  However, autonomous UASs have the capability of making this decision without human input.  Due to the high-risk nature of warfare, this author suggests that it is preferable to have a human making lethal decisions rather than an autonomous UAS.
Conclusively, although UASs should continue to be used in warfare, automated lethality should not be used as a person should always be in the loop for moral considerations.

References
Barnhart, R. K., Shappee, E., and Marshall, D. M. (2011). Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft
Systems. London, GBR: CRC Press. Retrieved from http://www.ebrary.com
Straub, J. (2013).  Unmanned aerial systems: consideration of the use of force for law
enforcement applications.  Technology in Society. doi:10.1016/j.techsoc.2013.12.004

           


Wednesday, December 10, 2014

Unmanned Aircraft Systems crewmember selection: A review of the Insitu ScanEagle and General Atomics Ikhana

The ScanEagle and the Ikhana serve very different purposes, hence their significant difference in size and features.  At 39 pounds in weight, the ScanEagle spans approximately 5.1 feet in length and is double that (10.2 feet) in wingspan (Insitu, 2013).  Due to its size, the ScanEagle is considered to be a small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS).  According to its specifications, the ScanEagle is capable of completing over 24 hours of flight time and is able to climb altitudes of 19,500 feet (Insitu, 2013).  The Ikhana, in contrast, is a rather large UAS with a length of over 36 feet and a wingspan of approximately 66 feet.  The Ikhana is also capable of flying altitudes more than twice as high as the ScanEagle as it reaches approximately 40,000 feet (Insitu, 2013).  Due to these variances, the ScanEagle and the Ikhana serve very different purposes in the field.
The ScanEagle, as its name implies, is ideal for monitoring (or scanning) in various missions such as disaster response, search and rescue, criminal pursuits, and wildlife monitoring among others (Insitu, 2013).  The Ikhana on the other hand is typically used to conduct critical missions in the fields of intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (NASA, 2007).  Further, due to their size differences as well as the significant difference in missions for the ScanEagle versus the Ikhana, UAS crewmember selection varies for each as well.
Both the ScanEagle and the Ikhana require two operators for successful flight missions; however, operators are not responsible for the same task in each case.  When considering the ScanEagle, one operator is necessary in order to determine flight path and to control the aircraft itself; conversely, the second operator is tasked to control the payload (Pappalardo, 2007).  The Ikhana also requires two operators, however this is a minimum as multiple operator crews may sometimes be necessary over longer missions.  In the case of the two operators for the Ikhana, one is responsible for maintaining control of the aircraft while the second is responsible for overseeing the payload.  Again, although this is similar to the small UAS operations, the difference is primarily that due to the longer duration of the missions for the Ikhana, these operators will typically need to be rotated in shifts over time.  The ScanEagle and Ikhana also differ in their crewmember licensing requirements.
As a small UAS, operators of the ScanEagle are not required to have a pilot’s license.  These in turn results in a much larger availability of pilots for the small UAS as there is no license restriction.  Conversely, operators or pilots of large UASs such as the Ikhana must currently have a commercial pilot license according to the FAA (FAA, 2007).  Consequently, it is more difficult and takes more time to find the necessary operators for the Ikhana than it would for the ScanEagle.  Additionally, it is rather easy for an individual to learn how to operate a ScanEagle.  According to their website, Insitu offers a course over a span of 10 weeks that would ultimately result in the certification of operators for the ScanEagle (Insitu, 2013).  The Ikhana, however, requires approximately a year of training in order to learn how to properly operate such a large UAS (FAA, 2007).
There are a few factors that ideally can be considered in order to identify the most highly qualified applicants to these positions that would also ensure compliance with all regulations and laws.  In terms of the ScanEagle, the company in question should take into consideration the operators’ overall flight experience with similar small UASs as well as manned aircraft.  However, specific training should also be offered upon selection in order to familiarize the operators with his/her specific UAS (in this case the ScanEagle).  This training could provide a certification (such as the 10 week process previously mentioned) that would allow the company to weed out qualified versus unqualified individuals. 
Operators for the Ikhana, on the other hand, should also have experience with similar large aircraft and large UASs in particular.  These pilots would ideally have experience particularly in large UASs, however the company should also consider licensed pilots or large manned aircraft in general in order to widen the currently limited selection available.  Similarly to the small UAS training, pilots for the Ikhana should also receive specified additional training that targets the particular requirements necessary to successfully operate the Ikhana and large UASs in general.  Certification may also be granted upon completion and this would allow for compliance of laws and regulations as well as serve as a means of determining which pilots are truly qualified for the job as operators. 


References
Insitu. (2013). ScanEagle. Retrieved from http://www.insitu.com/systems/scaneagle
FAA. (2007). Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System. Retrieved from
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/reg/media/frnotice_uas.pdf
NASA. (2007). Ikhana/Predator B. Unmanned Science and Research Aircraft System.
Retrieved from http://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/news/FactSheets/FS-097-DFRC.html
Pappalardo, J. (2007). Flocking ScanEagles. Air & Space Magazine. Retrieved from
http://www.airspacemag.com/military-aviation/FEATURE-Scaneagles.html.



Sunday, December 7, 2014

Unmanned Aircraft Systems operational risk management: A Review of the PUMA AE

The AeroVironment’s Puma AE is a small unmanned aircraft system (or vehicle to be more specific) that is intended to be utilized in situations requiring low operational cost and very little manpower.  It is small in size and weight and requires minimal logistical operations.  The Puma AE in particular is designed for tactical intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions.  It is capable of transmitting live video directly to the Ground Control System and can navigate autonomously due to its GPS-based system.  Below is the date for the Puma AE in regards to its specifications, preliminary hazards list (PHL), preliminary hazards assessment (PHA), operational hazard review and analysis (OHR&A), and ORM assessment tool (see Figure 1).

SPECIFICATIONS
Payloads
Gimbaled payload, 360 degree continuous pan,
+10 to -90 degrees tilt, stabilized EO, IR camera,
and IR Illuminator all in one modular payload.
Range
15 km
Endurance
3.5+ hours
Speed
37-83 km/h, 2-45 knots
Operating Altitude
500 ft (152 m) AGL
Wing Span
9.2 ft (2.8 m)
Length
4.6 ft (1.4 m)
Weight
13.5 lbs (6.1 kg)
GCS
Common GCS with Raven, Wasp and Shrike
Launch Method
Hand-launched, rail launch (optional)
Recovery Method
Autonomous or manual deep-stall landing


Figure 1. Specifications of the sUAS the Puma AE.  The table lists various specifications of the PUMA including payloads, range, endurance, speed, operating altitude, wing span, length, weight, GCS, launch method and recovery method.  Specifications borrowed from Avinc.com.
Next, the preliminary hazards assessment (PHA) tool will be discussed.  This tool is a semi-quantitative analysis utilized in the launch and operations of the Puma AE in order to aid in the identification of all possible hazards and/or accidental events that could ultimately result in an accident.  Further, it is used to help rank said accidental events according to their level of severity and it can also be utilized in the identification of required hazard controls and follow up actions.  In the case of sUASs, the PHA tool can be completed to perform a complete risk analysis of the Puma. 
There are several important components to the PHA but the following are the most critical items to consider: 1) hazardous conditions 2) safety related interfaces 3) environmental constraints 4) operating, test, maintenance, built-in-tests, diagnostics and emergency procedures, 5) facilities, property installed equipment and training 6) Safety equipment, safeguards and 7) malfunctions to system/software (Barnhart, Hottman, Marshall, & Shappee, 2011).  This list helps establish risk prior to launch (see Figure 2).  Further, the following is an example of the PHA for the Puma AE:
PRELIMINARY HAZARDS WORKSHEET ANALYSIS
System: Puma AE       Operating mode:                     Analyst:                      Date:

Ref.
Hazard
Accidental event
Probable causes
Contingencies/Preventative actions
Prob.
Sev.
Other/Comments


















Ref. = Reference Prob. = Probability Sev. = Severity
Figure 2. An example of a Preliminary Hazards Assessment worksheet for the sUAS, Puma AE. 
           
Following this list an Operation Hazard Review and Analysis (OHR&A) should be developed (Figure 3).  Although at first glance the OHR&A seems quite similar to the PHA, this particular list differs in that it focuses on specific items that could arise within the actual UAS flight operation.  In this list, there are two primary differences.  The first is that the operational stage checklist is added.  This allows the individual to track these events for various operational stages of flight.  The second and more important section added is the ‘action review’ column.  In the PHA, the aim was primarily to identify safety issues early on in UAS operations; however, the goal with OHR&A is to continue that safety protocol and review the actions taken and their results throughout the process.  According to the text, the action review column is used to list if the identified mitigating actions implemented from the PHA were adequate in responding to the hazard (Barnhart, Hottman, Marshall, & Shappee, 2011).

OPERATION HAZARD REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

System: Puma AE       Operating mode:                     Analyst:                      Date:

Operational Stage:     [ ] Planning     [ ] Staging       [ ] Launch      [ ] Flight      [ ] Recovery

Ref.
Action Review
Hazard
Accidental event
Probable causes
Contingencies/
Preventative actions
Prob.
Sev.
Other/
Comments



















Ref. = Reference Prob. = Probability Sev. = Severity

Figure 3. An example of an Operation Hazard Review and Analysis for the sUAS, Puma AE.

Finally, the Operational Risk Management (ORM) is a tool utilized for the evaluation of typical operational hazards.  It takes common operational hazards into consideration and ranks them in regards to their level of severity and the probability of their occurrence.  As a small UAS, the PUMA AE is susceptible to various hazards.  The following is a example of an ORM worksheet for the risk assessment of the PUMA AE (see Figure 4).
PUMA AE Risk Assessment
Date: 
Aircraft: PUMA AE
Serial #: 
UAS Crew/Station:
_______________/____________           _______________/____________
_______________/____________           _______________/____________
Mission Type
SUPPORT
TRAINING
PAYLOAD CHECK
EXPERIMENTAL
1
2
3
4
Hardware Changes
NO
YES
1
4
Software Changes/Calibration
NO
YES
1
4
Airspace of Operation
WIDE OPEN
MINIMAL HAZ
MODERATE HAZ
ABUNDANT HAZ
1
2
3
4
Operator Experience with this Aircraft
EXPERT
ADVANCED
INTERMEDIATE
NOVICE
1
2
3
4
Flight Time
DAY
NIGHT
1
4
Type of Flight
LOS
LOS/BLOS
BLOS
FPV
1
2
3
4
Visibility
> 10 MILES
6-9 MILES
2-5 MILES
< 2 MILES
1
2
3
4
Surface Winds
0-5 KTS
5-15 KTS
> 15 KTS
2
3
4
Forecast Winds
0-5 KTS
5-15 KTS
> 15 KTS
2
3
4
Weather Deteriorating
NO
YES
1
4
Other Airspace Activity
NO
YES
1
4
Established Lost Link Procedures
YES
NO
1
NO FLIGHT
GPS Satellites Acquired
ALL 3
2
1
NONE
1
2
3
4
Proper "home" Location Set
YES
NO
1
4
Potential For Tx/Rx Interference
NONE
SOME
MODERATE
SEVERE
1
2
NO FLIGHT
NO FLIGHT
Total
RISK LEVEL
18-27
28-36
37-45
45-56
LOW
MEDIUM
SERIOUS
HIGH
Aircraft Number: __________________       Aircraft Type:  _______________________
Flight Released By:  _____________________________  Date: ____________  Time: ____________

Figure 4. PUMA AE Operational Risk Management worksheet.  This worksheet is borrowed/adapted from: Barnhart, R., Hottman, S., Marshall, D., & Shappee, E. (2011).Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems. London: CRC Press. page 128.





References
Avinc.com (2014).  Puma AE: Introducting new capabilities.  Retrieved from
http://www.avinc.com/downloads/DS_Puma_Online_10112013.pdf
Barnhart, R., Hottman, S., Marshall, D., & Shappee, E. (2011). Introduction to Unmanned
Aircraft Systems. London: CRC Press.